The stepwise evolution of conventional production facilities into future Smart Factory or Industrial IoT paradigms entails special requirements on future industrial devices and communication networks. Due to the considerably increasing demand of interconnected devices -for internal and even external remote access -various security measures of future industrial equipment must be improved. Therefore, this paper presents an application-and feasibility study of secured communication between today's and future stationary industrial devices -based on the upcoming OPC UA protocol and partially enhanced with hardware-based security.
I. INTRODUCTION
One major key factor of typical "Industrial IoT" (IIoT) and Smart Factory concepts is the demand for increased flexibility. This not only includes increased and customizable production flexibility, but also includes requirements for higher flexibility in the way how new production equipment can be installed, regularly maintained and updated. As pointed out by [1] such flexible Smart Factory approaches enable new business models, services and products, and eventually are expected to increase the economic value of a factory. One prerequisite for the factory to become more flexible is that the interconnections gradually change from the usually centralized approach into a more distributed one.
As further described in [2] , moving away from isolated systems to open, interconnected systems is one of the big challenges tackled by the Industrial IoT. Particularly due to the increasing demand of extensive machine data acquisition for big data analysis, as well as the increasing demand for device access for remote maintenance (both requiring devices to be permanently connected), various security measures of future industrial equipment and networks must be improved. Consequently, these security aspects are further discussed in this paper, with the primary focus on application level, discussing how hardware-based security solutions [3] can be practically used in addition to improve various security measures of future Industrial IoT applications. Therefore, this paper presents an application-and feasibility study how hardware-based security could be already used in a rather short-term evolution step for secured communication.
II. RELATED WORK a) IIoT and hardware-based security: Various security issues of conventional industrial control systems are summarized in [4] which also confirms the need for improved security measures. This work presents an overview of various cyber threats and vulnerabilities in the industrial context. One prominent example is "Stuxnet", a computer worm reportedly designed to take over the control of a field network, but there are various other IIoT-specific threads which recently have been discussed in [5] , [6] , [7] . Similarly as Sisinni et al. [2] also Jiang et al. [8] identify the interconnections between currently separated zones within industrial networks as potential malicious threats, which also underlines that future industrial equipment should be secured at device level.
In order to avoid security concepts relying on network separation, directly the industrial devices or at least their interface to the network must be secured internally. However, similarly to security issues recently discussed in the general IT and IoT context, pure software-based security solutions are often insufficient to stem attacks [9] . Therefore, already a few years ago early concepts proposing the additionally including hardware-based security have been published, for example derived from mobile computing and smart card applications [10] or already proposed for general IoT applications [11] .
In general, there are various approaches for hardware-based security measures. One more recent area of research discusses the potential of various "Physical Unclonable Functions" (PUF). According to various literature of past few years, such PUFs could be able to support mutual authentication protocols [12] , or could be used for building a true random number generator (TRNG) [13] . Furthermore, according to very recent literature some approaches even could be reconfigured, a feature which could enable potential regular key updates in future applications as stated in [14] . However, since some of the proposed PUFs have been successfully attacked [15] , [16] , [17] , this security approach is not considered for the IIoT security application of this work. Another different hardware-based security approach are microcontrollers with integrated security extensions -one prominent example is the ARM TrustZone technology. However, researchers recently have published various potential TrustZone related attacks. For example, in [18] the authors describe software issues allowing to revert trustlet updates. Various side channel attacks have been published, for example cache probing attacks discussed in [19] , or attacks based on electromagnetic analyses [20] .
Due to the above mentioned potential attacks on PUF and TrustZone-based technologies, the use of a physically separated discrete security controller is advised, which is widely used in smart card and TPM applications, but recently upcoming in the IoT. Therefore this research focuses on using an Infineon Secure Element [3] .
Moreover, the use of Secure Elements has been recently proposed not only for IoT, but also for Industrial IoT applications [21] -not only to efficiently protect machine identities but also protect their communication. That is because such hardware typically provides secured storage for secret keys and protects cryptographic operations [3] , which can be used for typical public key infrastructure protocols. However, since most of these related publications are rather focused on analyzing the advantages of these additional security measures itself, most of these studies still lack concrete application examples to document if and how such hardware-based security concepts could be practically applied to established or upcoming communication protocols in the industrial context. Consequently, this is the connecting factor to the application study of this work presented herein.
b) Security of industrial protocols: In the area of industrial protocols, various research and studies recently have been proposing the use of the "OPC Unified Architecture" (OPC UA) protocol and discussed its advantages. First security analysis and measures for OPC UA have been discussed by [22] , who also addressed security objectives at different levels. On the communication layer, secured channels are defined for confidentiality, integrity, while on the application layer, sessions take care of user authorization and authentication -parts of these security concepts were later integrated into the security model of the OPC UA specification [23] . Based on this security specification, the German federal office for information security (BSI) has recently carried out a study on the security measures of OPC UA. Based on the analyzation of systematic errors and static and dynamic code analysis of a reference implementation of the OPC Foundation, the BSI concluded that in contrast to various other industrial protocols, OPC UA is able to provide a high level of security [24] .
However, these early research and analysis was focused on pure software-based security for OPC UA. The further improvement based on additional hardware-based security measures have only been introduced very recently in the context of OPC UA. The authors of [25] proposed the partly usage of hardware-based security for OPC UA, based on features provided by a standard "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM). The authors propose using the TPM for platform integrity checks at system startup, using its features for true random number generation, and key generation and storage. However, due to its standardized and fixed command set, some security measures have not been shifted to the hardware security module -which is also a starting point of the following sections in this paper.
In other related work in the more wider IoT context (which is a side-topic of this application study), another protocol has become very popular, the OASIS open standard "Message Queue Telemetry Transport" (MQTT), which is a lightweight publish-subscribe messaging protocol with focus on limited bandwidth networks (partly also used for sensor networks). By default, MQTT does not provide any mechanisms for confidentiality and authentication. For this reason, the widespread TLS standard can be used for securing this protocol. One drawback particularly on resource-constrained embedded systems of using software-based TLS is pointed out by [26] , that using MQTT over TLS requires additional CPU usage of the host controller. However, not only this drawback, but also the general level of security can be improved when using hardware security modules in combination with TLS software libraries, such as OpenSSL or WolfSSL as described in [27] . Consequently, since this paper focuses on hardwarebased security in OPC UA context, these "MQTT over TLS" methods are used as already provided in related work (for example available as open source in [28] ) -and in the illustrations herein further denoted as "MQTTS".
III. DESIGN AND SECURITY CONCEPTS

A. Industrial IoT Network Scenario
This section presents the underlying concept of the proposed secured "Industrial IoT" network. The communication setup and the corresponding implementation are based on an industrial demonstration environment which is partly derived from real production environment and protocols. The basic network concept of the application study is split into three parts, as sketched in Figure 1 :
First, the "Internal/Main Network" includes future industrial equipment, such as production machines, robots as well as user-clients for operation staff, with already built-in security, and therefore can be interconnected via typical existing standard network infrastructure. For security reasons, this concept proposes the use of the upcoming OPC UA protocol standard for industrial automation, particularly since this protocol also natively supports various state of the art security measures [23] . In addition -in order to further increase the security of the device -the industrial devices are enhanced with a hardware-based discrete Secure Element (SE). In modern ITand embedded systems, such hardware-extensions are used as trust anchors for protecting secret keys and cryptographic operations. This approach is advised, because various incidents in recent years have shown that software measures alone do not generally provide sufficient protection against various remote cyber-attacks [3] . For illustration purposes, Figure 1 and Figure 5 indicate the additional hardware-based device protection by the "padlock" icon.
The second network zone depicted in Figure 1 particularly considers the step-wise transition of today's production facilities into Industrial IoT, by integrating existing older "Legacy Equipment" (without built-in security) into the modern secured network with the help of separate "Security Translator" devices. Finally, the third zone is used for enabling future Industrial IoT use cases -such as remote-and predictive maintenanceanother translator device is used as gateway to cloud services, for example via MQTT protocol over TLS (herein denoted as "MQTTS"), as also described in [26] . In this way, the gateway provides selected filtered machine data, which is only relevant for maintenance purposes, to external companies.
B. Functional Integration of Secure Element (SE)
The primary focus of the security concept and application study is that the "Internal/Main Network" sketched in Figure 1 should not be executed in pure software as in conventional solutions, but additionally secured by a hardware-based SE, due to reasons and benefits described in [3] . More specifically, to allow for higher adaptability to application-specific protocols, a "Java Card OS"-programmable SE is used. With this hardware basis, specific parts of the cryptographic operations of the OPC UA protocol -which are further discussed in this work -can be transferred to the secured execution environment by using a customized "Java Card Applet". For example, the asymmetric key pairs are generated on the SE, so that the private key remains in its secured storage. Another design requirement is the use of the "Aes256-Sha256-RsaPss" OPC UA security policy which was added in the most recent OPC UA Profiles specification (1.04) and currently provides the highest security level in OPC UA. Figure 2 provides an overview of the typical OPC UA authentication and key agreement mechanism during connection establishment (further described in [29] ). Additionally, in this figure the identified portions are marked, where it makes sense to partly shift operations or generated keys into the SE. Further details and the required command-enhancements of the SE will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
C. Command enhancements of Secure Element
This subsection describes the command enhancements of the Java Card Applet of the SE. The underlying low-level communication between the host controller of the industrial device and the hardware-based SE typically can be done in via various commonly used interfaces (SPI, I2C, USB), depending on the used hardware-variant of the SE. In this application study, the SE is connected via the USB "smart card" device class ("Chip Card Interface Device" (CCID)), since it allows Figure 3 . X.509 certificate generation process with Secure Element support a flexible USB-connection to the chosen "Raspberry Pi" prototyping platform. The low-level command interface is based the "Application Protocol Data Unit Messages" (APDU) [30] , which is the common standard used in chip card and related security hardware. On top of these APDU commands, the Java Card Applet of the SE has been customized with following defined commands: a) Generate Asym. Key: This command is used to generate a local RSA key pair on the SE. b) Get Asym. Key: This command returns the previously generated and currently active local RSA public key. However, there is no command implemented which returns the RSA private key. The Java Card Applet also does not provide the option to insert RSA private keys from the outside. c) Sign Certificate Signing Request (CSR): Since the OPC UA security policies [23] require the use of X.509 certificates, the host should be able to generate a CSR based on the previously generated RSA key pair. The first two parts of the CSR, the certificate request information and the signature algorithm identifier, are generated on the host. This command is then used to provide the third and last part, the actual signature of the other two parts. This process is visualized in Figure 3 . As the APDU specification allows just 255 bytes of data per command, the commands of the cryptographic operations are designed in the init-update-final model, which allows for transmitting the data sequentially. d) Set Asym. Key: During the OPC UA connection establishment, the X.509 certificate of the remote side is received. This certificate contains the RSA public key of the remote side, which is extracted as it is required for further cryptographic operations. This command is then used to inform the Java Card Applet about the new remote RSA public key. Beside of the public key, the host must inform the Java Card Applet about the corresponding ID of the remote entity. This is required to be able to serve multiple connections with different remote hosts at the same time. e) Verify Certificate: This command is used to verify the received remote certificate. Therefore, it requires the remote certificate, the signature of the remote certificate and the ID of the RSA public key that should be used for the verification (usually of the corresponding Certificate Authority (CA)). Again, this command is designed in the init-updatefinal model. i) Set Sym. Keys: This command is used to map the generated symmetric cipher and signature keys to the given remote ID. j) Sym. Encrypt and Decrypt: These commands are used to encrypt Secure Channel Messages (MSG) with the remote symmetric cipher key of the given ID, or to decrypt MSG messages with the local symmetric cipher key of the given ID. Also these commands are designed in the init-update-final model, where the initial step must contain the generated IV as data.
k) Sym. Sign and Verify: These commands are used so sign MSG messages with the local symmetric signing key of the given ID or verify MSG messages with the remote symmetric signing key of the given ID. Again, these commands are designed in the init-update-final model. l) Random Number Generation: This command is used to get bytes from the SE's true random number generator (TRNG). The amount of needed random bytes is required as argument.
The resulting final design of the OPC UA communication sequence using hardware-based SEs is depicted in Figure 4 : The described customized commands are used to protect the OPC UA "Open Secure Channel Request/Response" sequences (OPN messages), the KDF, and the further communication (MSG messages) -see further details in the corresponding OPC UA security specification [23] . In the proposed enhanced hardware-secured variant, the commands are initiated by the respective host controllers of the OPC UA "Client and Server" devices and specific parts are then redirected to the respective SEs which are connected to each device (in this specific case connected via USB) -using the customized enhanced APDU commands listed above. The introduced concepts have been partly implemented and evaluated in a proof-of-concept demonstrator, depicted in Figure 5 . Since its primary focus is the exploration and evaluation of use cases for the discrete hardware-based Secure Element (SE), the actual simulated exemplary industrial data and industrial protocol implementations are based on the commonly available prototyping components which are not intended for productive use ("Raspberry Pi" development platforms and various open-source protocol libraries). The actual focus and novelty of the implemented application-and feasibility study is summarized below:
• For higher flexibility in the course of this feasibility study, a customized Infineon test-chip variant has been used as basis of the SE. This variant also includes Java Card OS, and therefore can be easily customized to applicationspecific needs with Java Card Applets. • For the application-specific evaluation, the firmware and commands of the SE has been partly enhanced for some derived application-specific use cases.
• The OPC UA software-library (used as basis on the Raspberry Pi, open62541 [31] ) has been partly enhanced to use the SE instead of pure software-libraries for specific operations. • With the help of standard and customized Java Cardbased APDU commands the SE is basically used for: Generating and storing RSA key pairs in the secured storage, and verifying/signing the certificates as well as session key derivation during the OPC UA session establishment (handshake prior to the data communication).
The demonstration software at the Raspberry Pi devices (and the underlying OPC UA software library) has been implemented in a way to shift parts of the security-relevant keys and operations into the protected execution environment of the customized SE. This includes the initial generation of asymmetric key pairs, secured storage of private keys, and particularly the protection of the OPC UA OPN and MSG messages, which are encrypted/decrypted and signed/verified by the SE. Finally, the experimental results were targeted to evaluate the feasibility and also the backwards-compatibility of the hardware-assisted implementation. Therefore, the demonstrator has not only been tested in a pure OPC UA communication setup with partial hardware-based security activated between the OPC UA devices (depicted as green dotted circle in Figure 5 ), but also tested in a mixed setup, where the partial hardware-protected devices have been communicating with the pure software-based open62541 library implementations. In comparison to the recently published TPM-based protection approach [25] , the increased flexibility of the Java Card OS based approach has been demonstrated, as in this implementation, parts of the software-based OPC UA security stack functionality could be moved to a customized Java Card Applet.
The demonstrated results have confirmed that the hybrid partial hardware-secured implementation is compatible with the original software-based OPC UA implementation, and therefore can be used for a step-wise integration and migration into future Industrial IoT methodology, combining:
• Protocol-and security translation of existing older legacy devices (without integrated security). For testing a more realistic application scenario, the exemplary used legacy protocol "SECS/GEM" has been partly derived from real semiconductor production environment. • First-generation OPC UA compatible devices (pure software-based OPC UA)
• Future potential OPC UA devices with improved hardware-based security measures • As well as filtered and secured data translation to cloud services for remote maintenance (e.g. via MQTTS) All these typical use cases are combined in the applicationand feasibility study into an overall future "Industrial IoT Secured Communication" scenario -based on the initial concept depicted in Figure 1 , and its final result shown in Figure 5 .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented useful approaches of how hardware-based Secure Elements can be used as supplement to existing hardware and software systems, in order to improve several security measures of future Industrial IoT applications. Depending on the variety of use cases, the discussed hardwarebased security approaches can be partially used for authentication and authorization of devices and users, and partially used for communication protocols and protocol translation. Although the main part has been focused on OPC UA, the proposed hardware-based security concepts might be adaptable for other related industrial protocols.
The finally presented application study not only provides concepts for integrating and translating existing legacy devices into modern secured networks. Additionally, the implementations demonstrate the feasibility to gradually integrate future hardware-secured equipment in a compatible way into the upcoming OPC UA protocol networks. In this way, the approach also allows for the step-wise transition of conventional industrial networks into future secured Industrial IoT networks.
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